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Abstract: This thesis analyses the dynamics of religious reform in the USSR from 1917
to 1943 focusing on the role of world religions (Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity) with
the emphasis on the fate of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). It argues that the
early Bolshevik policy of secularization and persecution was increasingly substituted by
state co-optation. This dynamic was shaped primarily by the late Stalinist concerns with
state security and worldwide ideological competition to Marxism-Leninism, above all by
the perceived threat of the Vatican’s influence within the USSR. The thesis employs a
range of primary and secondary sources that study the evolution of Soviet religions
policy. It offers a model for combining intellectual history focused on ideas and
individuals with social history of religious institutions. The author studies how the ideas
about the state and religion were developed by politically influential Marxist ideologists
and relates those debates to issues concerning the property of religious organizations,
their changing legal status, and the persecution and rehabilitation of the clergy. This
thesis will be of interest to the students of the Soviet and post-Soviet world, history of
religions, and international politics.
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The great historical turning points were accompanied by changes in religion only insofar as
the three still existing world religions are concerned: Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam.1

— Friedrich Engels, “Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy” (1886)

Introduction: Marxist-Leninist State Building and World Religions

When the Bolsheviks won the Russian Civil War in 1921 and established their
political dominance over most of the territories of the defunct Russian Empire, they
became the creators of a new kind of state without precedent in all of human history.
Never before in history had a small group of ideologically dedicated atheist radicals
found themselves administering one of the largest countries in the world - moreover, a
country that was seemingly out of tune with many of their progressive ideas. The former
Russian Empire was largely peasant, politically and socially conservative, officially
Christian, but at the same time composed of the representatives of a dazzling variety of
ethnic groups that were divided by religion, language, and race, and loosely bound
together by the legacy of Russian tsars. The contrast between the ideas of the new
rulers and the traditional politics of the state they had conquered could not have been
starker.
The Soviet Union of Socialist Republics (the USSR) came into existence on
December 30, 1922. From the beginning it was meant to become a new type of state, a
1

Фридрих Энгельс, Людвиг Фейербах и Конец Немецкой Классической Философии (Москва:
Издательство Политической Литературы, 1976), 29.
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successor to the Russian Empire but also an embodiment of a completely new type of
economy, ideology, and body politic. The founding of the USSR was a result of the bitter
civil war that lasted for five years (1917-1922); it began with the abdication of the tsar
and resulted in the defeat of the conservative, nationalist forces during the years that
followed.
The victory of the Bolsheviks represented a rupture with the past, at least in the
eyes of the victors. No longer would the empire be founded on the traditionalist
principles of tsarist autocracy, Eastern Christianity, and Slavic nationalism. All those
ancient principles were to be discarded in favor of an atheist and materialist utopian
creed that was based on Marxism-Leninism. According to this worldview, the revolution
was not only desirable but inevitable; the Bolshevik conquest of Russia was just the first
step in that direction.
The belief in the inevitability of the eventual establishment of the global
Communist utopia, and the fear of foreign intervention and subversion, largely defined
the mindset of Soviet rulers. It coupled hope with paranoia, the interest in everything
modern with the fear of everything foreign. It also largely shaped the policy of the USSR
which, despite being an ostensibly Westernizing project, tended to distance itself from
the West while declaring itself a defender of modern, progressive ideas. In part, this
attitude was the legacy of the civil war years. The experience of that confrontation made
the Bolsheviks understand that the society around them harbored enemies who desired
their destruction and who were willing to unite with, or to seek assistance from,
foreigners in order to fight the new rulers.

5

This paradoxical nature of the Soviet Communist experience, at once open to
reform but opposed to the modernizing projects of capitalism, found its most impressive
historical incarnation in the story of the Bolshevik policy of reforming the key institution
of the defunct Russian Empire - religion.
The empire of tsars was in many ways more conservative than the rest of
Europe. It was ruled by a royal bloodline of emperors (“tsar” is a phonetic derivation of
Roman “caesar”), whose throne was considered sacred and whose authority was
absolute. He was also a de-facto head of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), which
had become totally subordinated to the state following the reforms of Peter the Great.
The empire was understood as a property of the nation and the sovereign; everyone
who was not considered “native” (i.e., Russian) enough was referred to as “inorodets”
(“of a foreign bloodline,” plural “inorodtsy”) and had limited citizen rights and duties; the
term became legally fixed in 1822 and then gradually extended to most national and
religious minorities.2
The Bolsheviks, in contrast, believed in universal citizenship, rejected the royal
authority, did not support religion, and did not seek the legitimacy of a traditional state
but instead sought a revolutionary break with it. In addition, they believed that ethnic
identity is transitory and will vanish in a true Marxist state.3 Those positions quickly
brought them into conflict with the defenders of tsarist and, more broadly, conservative
European values. The Bolsheviks had to resort to large-scale violence and other forms
of social engineering to impose their views on the populace.

2

John W. Slocum, “Who, and When, Were the Inorodtsy? The Evolution of the Category of "Aliens" in
Imperial Russia.” Russian Review, 57(2) (1998): 173–90.
3
Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 5-6.
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The early Bolshevik rule was marked by the increasing hostility of the
revolutionaries to what they considered to be outmoded, archaic, and reactionary
aspects of the old society. Religion was foremost among those. The hostility culminated
in the purges of the late 1930s when most Soviet religious institutions - together with
much else that belonged to the old world - were either eliminated completely or brought
to the very edge of survival.
And yet, starting with the events of the Second World War and the years
immediately following that conflict, the Soviet state reversed many of its policies
concerning traditional religious organizations and actively worked to reinstate, reform,
and even expand several of the key denominations. In particular, the year 1943 was a
watershed moment. A sort of truce, often referred to as a “concordat” (following the
western precedents) between the Soviet state and its main religious bodies (Christianity,
Islam, Buddhism) was established, which allowed for reopening of temples, training of
religious specialists, public performance of rituals, and even limited social activities. The
biggest religious organization in the USSR, the Orthodox Church, a traditional religion of
Eastern Slavs, underwent a revival, and was even able to elect a new leader, the
Patriarch - a privilege denied even by the last generations of tsars.
This strange reversal of policy, which seemingly does not fit with what we know
about early Bolshevik ideology and practice, raises many questions, some of which will
be addressed extensively in this thesis. The contemporaries of the events of the 1930s
and 1940s were often baffled by what they thought was the Bolsheviks’ return to tsarist
political and ideological practices. They felt that it could even be called the “betrayal of
the revolution,” and the attempt to prop up the regime by using counterrevolutionary
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organization. The tsarist autocracy was replaced by Joseph Stalin’s dictatorship. The
preeminence of Muscovite Russians (or “Great Russians”) in the USSR was once again
being emphasized, and the traditional bulwark of the Russian Empire, the Orthodox
Church, was being revived and given a new role in the society.
The thesis of this project argues, however, that the idea that the Bolsheviks, and
their leader Joseph Stalin, gave up on the building of Marxist socialism and reverted to
the old, tsarist model to prop up their rule is untenable. There is no historical evidence
to prove that during wartime in the 1940s the Bolsheviks lost interest in Marxist
ideology, world revolution, and materialist philosophy. On the contrary, the war had only
reinforced many convictions that were held dear by the Bolsheviks, among them the
reality of the Western threat, the superiority of the Soviet system proven by the victory in
the war, and the inevitability of Marxism’s spread to other countries.
So how to explain the revival of religious policies then? In order to understand
the reversal of Bolshevik policies around 1943 with regard to the massive Orthodox
Church and other significant religions like Islam and Buddhism, we need to understand
the Soviet mind as it developed during the first two decades of Soviet rule, and
particularly the mind of Joseph Stalin, the dictator who made all the key decision and
who was widely understood to be an ideological leader and interpreter within the party.
The idea of “appropriation” of religion by the Soviet elites is difficult to understand
unless we survey the development of Soviet religious policy over the years, which is
one of the goals of this thesis. The main methodological assumption here is the idea
that early Soviet leaders were pragmatic individuals with well-defined goals, but who
were also fervent believers in their ideology. Although plenty of decisions taken in the
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USSR could have been influenced by other factors, the Marxist-Leninist ideology was
usually the bedrock against which all political action was to be measured. It was
especially true of the leader, Joseph Stalin, a man who took ideology very seriously, and
considered himself an expert on Marxism.
It would be correct to assert that the revival of religion in the USSR had to do with
geopolitical considerations and questions of state security. As the USSR expanded its
influence far to the West following its victory in the Second World War, it became
subjected to western influences - including religious influences - that were perceived as
both a threat and an opportunity for the Soviet cause. Among the most worrying threats
was the potential for the expansion of the Vatican’s influence into the USSR. The Soviet
elite decided to use homeland-based religion to react to western influences, to expand
its power, and to play the puppet-master with the religious organizations both within and
outside the USSR. However, this does not mean that the Soviets compromised
ideologically with those organizations or that they decided to amalgamate with them in a
new blend of conservative religiosity and Marxist economics. On the contrary, Marxism
was to be the dominant partner, and the newly “reformed” world religions (Buddhism,
Christianity, Islam) would be the subordinate partners.
The thesis aims to counter the assumption that a given political organization, in
this case the Bolsheviks, necessarily had to be “pro-religion” or “against religion,”
ideologically. It was rather the case that Joseph Stalin increasingly began to see religion
as an institutional form that could be made to serve specific political goals. Stalin
wanted to take advantage of this insight in the context of his struggle for the worldwide
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triumph of Communism. Appropriation was increasingly seen as a better option than
outright repression.
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Chapter 1: The Religions of the Empire on the Eve of the Communist Takeover

The religious diversity of the Russian Empire on the eve of the Communist
takeover was staggering. Not only were most of Eurasian religions represented on its
soil, but they also coexisted within the boundaries of the same state, which was not the
case elsewhere in the world.
The official religion of the Russian Empire was Orthodox Christianity. It was not
only the religion of the tsar and his family and of all the “Great” Russians, but also of a
number of smaller ethnic groups such as the Ukrainians, the Belarusians, the
Georgians, the Moldovans, and others. Many of those non-Russian people had
Orthodox Christian traditions that were far older and more well-established than in
Russia proper. The Orthodox Church, as it existed then and as it still exists, was a
centralized religious institution but, unlike the Catholic Church, without an international
center like the Vatican. On the contrary, each sovereign state tended to have its own
independent Orthodox Church. The Russian tsar was traditionally conceived of as a
Christian “Roman” Emperor, the protector of the faith, and one of its central symbols.
Orthodox Christianity was demographically, politically, and culturally by far the
most important religion of the Russian Empire and remained as such during the Soviet
period and beyond. It is very important to note here that the pre-Revolutionary Russian
intellectuals, the Bolsheviks, as well as many contemporary scholars of Soviet religion
tended to think about “religion in Russia'' as “Orthodoxy in Russia.” In part, intellectuals
and Bolsheviks were influenced by the Western idea that Christianity was a
paradigmatic religion. They assumed that other religions of the empire operated in a
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similar way and they applied the models developed for managing the ROC to other
religions. It was a westernizing trend because Christianity was historically dominant in
the West. But they were also influenced by a nativist trend, because most Russians
were Orthodox, or at least acquainted with Orthodoxy as a family legacy. Whenever
they engaged with “outsider” religious communities, the Bolsheviks, just like the tsarist
officials before them, tended to use the Orthodox Church as a paradigm-building case
when it came to policies or organizational matters: whatever was true of Orthodoxy was
assumed to be true of Islam and Buddhism. In particular, just as the ROC was heavily
centralized, Sunni Islam and Buddhism also had to be centralized within the Soviet
state. Often when scholars discuss reforms of “religion” or “atheism” in the USSR, they
tend to discuss the Orthodox Church with little more than a digression on the fate of
other denominations.4 To some extent this approach is unavoidable and was also
largely adapted in this thesis as well, because whenever the Bolsheviks thought about
religion in the USSR, they thought first and foremost about Orthodoxy and then about
other religions. Therefore, constant reference to policies towards the Orthodox when
speaking of the history of other Soviet religions is helpful as a heuristic device to get
inside the minds of Soviet officials, but it has nothing to do with the real or imagined
similarities between various religious faiths of Eurasia.
The most significant non-Orthodox religious presence in the empire was along
the periphery. In the west, Protestant Finland and Estonia were historically linked with
the rest of Protestant Northern Europe, in particular, Sweden. Their form of religion was

4

One such scholar is Victoria Smolkin, A Sacred Space Is Never Empty: A History of Soviet Atheism
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2018), which presents itself as a history of Soviet atheism in its
title but focuses more specifically on the Orthodox Church. There are good reasons for adopting such an
approach, if only because of the numerical and ideological dominance of the ROC within Russia.
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Lutheranism, which had spread to northern Europe from Germany during the
Reformation. Protestantism never made any noticeable inroads in tsarist Russia proper,
although from the time of the Reformation it had a presence in Eastern and Central
Europe. Protestant Christianity became even less of a factor in the USSR after the
Bolsheviks failed to take possession of Finland, which ended up positioned outside the
Soviet borders.
Further south, the Russian Empire came into contact with Catholicism, which
was the non-native religion most familiar to Orthodox Russians and other Eastern Slavs
who had, at various points in their history, come under the domination of Catholic rulers.
Many were converted by Catholic missionaries or as a result of foreign state patronage,
especially in the western border regions of the Empire. At one point, it seemed very
likely that Moscow itself would be ruled by a Catholic prince, but the populace was able
to mobilize against the outsider religious threat. The kingdom of Poland was the most
powerful Catholic power in the region, although it was weakened and absorbed by the
Russian Empire and other Great Powers by the time of the Bolshevik Revolution. Its
place as a local nexus of Catholicism was briefly taken over by the Austro-Hungarian
Empire until it collapsed as a result of the First World War. Historically, Catholicism was
the very image of the “Other” for Orthodox Eastern Slavs; at the time of their conversion
in 998, Orthodoxy and Catholicism still formed a single church, but it subsequently split
into two branches in 1054, shortly after the conversion. Following this division, Catholics
were viewed as heretics and outsiders who refused to relent in its pursuit to expand
further east and convert (or, in their view, re-convert) the populations there. The Catholic
Church continued to exist in imperial Russia, given the large number of westerners

13

living and working in the empire, but it frequently faced hostility and suspicion of the
authorities, who were wary of its proselytizing tendencies and global reach.
Whereas different forms of Christianity co-existed in the Russian west, the south
of the empire was positioned along the dividing line between Christendom and the
Islamic world. Various Muslim peoples who lived in the mountainous areas of the
Caucasus had been subjugated during the long 19th century, a process reflected in
many works by classic Russian writers.5 After that, the empire expanded into Central
Asia where it was able to conquer the ancient kingdom of Bukhara, a historically
important theological, artistic, and political center of the Islamic world, as well as the
surrounding areas populated by nomadic and semi-nomadic Muslim peoples. Although
the tsarist government was reluctant to intrude too radically into the very foreign society
of Islamic Central Asia, the latter period of Russian expansion saw many Russian
settlers moving into the area to farm and to be employed by the government. During the
19th century and well into the late Soviet era during the Afghanistan war of the 1980s,
the rulers in Moscow were arguably concerned more about the geopolitics of Central
Asia and political competition with Great Britain (and later the USA) than with deepening
the engagement with the local populations.
Further east along the southern border of the Empire, it came into contact with
Buddhist communities that had survived the earlier Muslim intrusions into Central Asia.
The lands around Lake Baikal - the deepest lake and the largest body of freshwater
reserves in the world - were historically populated by Eastern Asian Buryat tribes who
were closely linked religiously and linguistically with their kin in Mongolia, and to Tibet

5

Shoshanna Keller, To Moscow not Mecca: Soviet Campaign against Islam in Central Asia, 1917-1941
(Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2001), 5.
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and its form of Buddhism. Many of the Buryats were eventually converted by Orthodox
missionaries, but most chose to remain Buddhist and were able to get the recognition
from tsar for their religion and their established links with Tibet and Mongolia. As was
the case in Muslim Central Asia, those communities were viewed as “inorodzy,” and,
aside from conflicts with the Slavic settlers, they were largely left to their own as long as
they acknowledged the power of the tsar over them. However, the Buryats were not the
only traditional Buddhist community in the Russian Empire; the other group large
enough to be mentioned here were the Kalmyks, an eastern Asian group who migrated
to western Russia and settled not far from the Caucasus along the lower reaches of the
river Volga. The Kalmyks, who still reside in that region even after several massive
displacements, voluntary and otherwise, professed the Tibetan variety of Buddhism.
In the north and northeast of the Russian Empire where the Eurasian landmass
ran into the inhospitable and cold regions of taiga and tundra, there were few human
settlements and no land borders with other countries. Nevertheless, Siberia - as the
region is referred to nowadays - was perhaps the most religiously diverse area in the
empire, marked not only by world religions and traditional creeds introduced from
elsewhere but also by many native varieties of Shamanism - a decentralized religion
focused on ecstatic practices, vision quests, and spirit animals, and prone to blending to
various degrees with other religions.
Most of those “foreign” faiths were found along the southern and eastern borders,
the longest in the world, and they became integrated into the Russian state as a result
of military conquests late in the empire’s history. That does not mean that foreign
religions did not exist in the Russian heartland as well. The ancient lands of Mari El to
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this day exist as a federative unit within the Russian Federation, not too far east from
Moscow. Some of the Finnic-speaking Mari people are now Orthodox but a significant
part of population still practices a version of an extremely ancient polytheistic religion
that once spread all over Eurasia and can be defined as “proto-Hindu,” because of its
historical links to other distant archaic religions of Eurasia, such as the Pakistani Kalash
people or the pre-Christian beliefs of the Balts. In addition, there were small groups of
Muslim Tatar people who lived under the tsars for a much longer time than the
borderland Muslims and who were, by the time of the Revolution, much more Russified
and secularized than their Central Asian or Caucasus-based co-religionists.
One has to also mention religious communities that were somewhat distinct from
the other religious groups. The newer Christian groups were found all over the empire
as a result of missionary activities or migration from further west. Many of them were
German settlers, Lutheran and Mennonite, farming land or living in the big cities,
involved in trade and science, and professing loyalty to the state. The Jews were an
important major group, mostly concentrated in Ukraine and Belarus along the western
border, in the lands once under the jurisdiction of Catholic rulers. This area was known
as the so-called “Pale of Settlement,” a legally designated part of the Russian Empire
where the Jews were permitted to settle. It was the largest concentration of a Jewish
population in the world at the time and included some of the holy places associated with
Hasidic spiritual leaders, religious schools, and other similar institutions. The tsars
recognized Judaism as a separate religion and nationality and used a variety of
restrictions to encourage conversions to Orthodoxy.
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After their victory in the Civil War in 1921 and the takeover of the country, the
Bolsheviks had to contend with this incredible diversity of religious life across their
Eurasian state, while at the same time trying to impose their vision of the new society on
the populace. That tension between received religious traditions and the Marxist
modernizing effort largely shaped the Soviet religious policy for the entirety of the
post-revolutionary period.
The Bolsheviks, secure in their identity as followers of Marxism with their
materialist and scientistic worldview based on a theory of economics, had no difficulty
presenting themselves as a pragmatic and no-nonsense force. Without this kind of
pragmatism, the Bolshevik party would not have survived for so long under the tsars,
nor would they have been able to seize power and emerge victorious in the Civil War.
The Bolsheviks approached the question of religion in the same pragmatic matter in
which they treated their military alliances or domestic reforms. The Bolsheviks were not
initially interested in all of the diverse religious traditions listed above, but when they did
become interested, it was in the service of expanding and maintaining their power.
Therefore, the more powerful religious institutions attracted most of their attention.
Insofar as the reforms of religion were concerned, from the very beginning the
Bolsheviks focused their attention on the ROC - the numerically strongest and the most
influential religious institution of the defunct empire. Nevertheless, minority religions also
elicited their interest - sometimes as an extension of their interest in national identity
politics of a specific region, but more often as material for the application of the methods
tried on the ROC.
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Chapter 2: Religion and Reform in the early USSR, 1917-1939

Politically, the Bolsheviks were hostile to all forms of traditional religion. In
addition, they opposed, on principle, any ideology or body of doctrine that was not
materialist and Marxian. This hostility can be explained in both ideological and practical
terms. The Russian Social Democratic Party (RSDP) was formed in 1898 in Minsk, at
the time a provincial city within the Russian Empire; the Bolsheviks constituted a faction
within the party that united various Russian followers of the socialist and materialist
philosophy of Karl Marx. Although the RSDP was not the only or even the first party to
coalesce around Marxist teaching, it eventually proved to be the strongest, once the
Bolshevik faction emerged triumphant and was able to seize power, directly or via
proxies, in key countries of the world in the course of the 20th century.
Fundamentally, the Bolsheviks were part of a movement that was deeply
influenced by the philosophical ideas popular in the West and originating from Germany.
They were united by the idea that history has a meaning and direction and believed that
the duty of intellectuals consisted in mobilizing the masses to propel history along its
predetermined course. Those were the ideas that originated with German philosopher
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), a notable thinker of his era. However,
Hegel tended to put his ideas in a mystical and idealist framework and was loyal to the
conservative German state. Such an interpretation was not acceptable to many left-wing
thinkers nor to men of action and prospective revolutionaries; before long, a more
palatable alternative emerged initially in the figure of Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872), a
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“young Hegelian,” who advocated atheism, and later in a more systematic way in the
writings of Karl Marx (1818-1883) and his follower Friedrich Engels (1820-1895).
Ludwig Feuerbach initially studied theology and Christian doctrine and was
influenced by Hegel. But later he turned away from the church. In 1841 he published
The Essence of Christianity, a book deeply critical of the Christian religion. However,
instead of disparaging religious doctrines, Feuerbach re-interpreted them, explaining
various elements of faith and theological doctrines in terms of the self-elevation of the
human mind. This “anthropological” approach allowed him and his admirers a way to
analyze Christian thinking in terms of the realities of the human situation. In his Essence
of Christianity Feuerbach attempted to demonstrate that whereas men thought that they
were worshiping God, they were, in fact, worshiping their own humanity.
This de-sacralization of religion was enthusiastically received by Marx and
Engels, who constructed their own system on the foundations laid by Feuerbach. They
re-interpreted the Feuerbachian humanity as the “species-being” of man seeking a
liberation from the oppressive economic system that stifled human potential and
prevented mankind from achieving creative freedom. This foundation seemed so solid
that its orthodoxy went unquestioned among the future generations of Communists. In
their opinion, Feuerbach had shown that the true God was indeed Man and it was
mankind that should be worshiped; Marx merely provided a practical explanation of how
to do it. In the famous passage in his Theses on Feuerbach (1845), Marx claimed that it
was necessary to go beyond Feuerbach and act in the name of social change; Marx’s
Bolshevik followers largely accepted this conclusion.6

6

Фридрих Энгельс, Людвиг Фейербах и Конец Немецкой Классической Философии (Москва:
Издательство Политической Литературы, 1976), 59.
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Friedrich Engels later summarized the importance of Feuerbach for Marxists in
his Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy (1886), one of the most
popular books of Marxist theory in Russia.7 Engels acknowledged the central
importance of Feuerbach in his book but blamed the thinker for his lack of interest in
social issues. In Engel’s view, it was Marx who completed Feuerbach’s system by
introducing the social dimension.
The implacable hostility towards old religion exhibited by the Bolsheviks derives
from this source. The various churches were condemned as “idealist,” i.e., unwilling to
relate religious doctrines to specific material conditions of existence. This condemnation
was not exclusive to religious organizations but was expanded to include the followers
of all “idealist” schools of thought, because any type of idealism was anathema to
official Marxism materialism. Religion, however, was thought to be a particularly
insidious enemy because of its power, popularity, resilience, and, most importantly, its
deep ties to the traditional capitalist and feudal states that the Communists wanted to
abolish. Therefore, it is not surprising that once the Bolsheviks seized power in
Petrograd they started to pay very close attention to matters relating to religion.
German philosophical thought, exemplified by the figures of Ludwig Feuerbach,
Karl Marx, and Friedrich Engels did not reach the pre-revolutionary Russian Empire
unmediated. Having been in close contact with the West for centuries, the Russians had
a home-grown radical socialist tradition that had also influenced the Bolsheviks. Unlike
in the case of Germany, it tended to express itself more in journalistic and literary than

7

Erik van Ree claims that the book was “more than Marx’s writings … the standard of Orthodox Marxism
among Russia’s Social Democrats” and that Stalin was fond of quoting from it as early as 1906.
Eric van Ree, The Political Thought of Joseph Stalin: A Study in Twentieth Century Revolutionary
Patriotism (New York, Routledge, 2002), 259.
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in philosophical forms. Among the most notable thinkers were Georgiy Plekhanov
(1856-1918), Nicolai Chernyshevski (1828-1889), and Mikhail Bakunin (1814-1876).
Bakunin, who became an opponent of Marxism from a leftist materialist and anarchist
standpoint, is still mostly known today for his book God and the State (1882) in which he
criticized religion as an instrument of oppression and envisioned a utopia. Those
thinkers preceded the Bolsheviks, historically, as they were part of an older generation
of political radicals, but they influenced the movement significantly, even when they
diverged from it ideologically.
Vladimir Lenin (1870-1924), the leader of the Bolsheviks, was particularly
intolerant of religion. He did not appear to care about the differences between the
western varieties of Christianity that Hegel and Feuerbach were grappling with and the
very different religious landscape of the defunct Russian Empire where western
religions were not widely practiced. In his essay “Religion and Socialism” (1905), Lenin
argued for the necessity of separating the religious organizations from the functions of
the state.8 For Vladimir Lenin, following Feuerbach and Marx, religion was the “opium of
the masses,” a mental construct, a dream that prevented the oppressed masses from
reaching their collective historical goal - the establishment of a materialist utopia in this
world. Lenin did not seem to preoccupy himself with the theoretical aspects of religion or
its relationship with socialism. He does seem to have been aware of experimental
programs of the Social Democratic churches in England where clergy prayed for God to
save them from capitalism, but he was apparently unimpressed with such spectacles.9

8

Smolkin, A Sacred Space Is Never Empty, 27.
Harvey Fireside, Icon and Swastika. The Russian Orthodox Church under Nazi and Soviet Control
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 17.
9

21

In general, Lenin’s attitude towards religion was little more than that of a
secularizer. He wanted to purge the state apparatus from clerical influences and he did
not assign much importance to anything beyond that goal. Although he presumably was
aware of other religions in the empire, Lenin was only concerned with the Orthodox
Church, which was by far the most influential organization among the religious groups of
old Russia. That is not to say that Lenin did not understand how religion was related to
broader culture in general and to utopian experiments in particular. During the early
Soviet period he took active interest in the economic life of the sectarian land
communes and even acted as their protector without ever accepting any of their
ideological commitments.10
The views of Vladimir Lenin swiftly became policy when the Bolsheviks published
three decrees in 1917-1918 aimed at separating church and state: “The Decree on
Land;” “On Civil Marriages, Children, and on the Registration of Acts of Civil Status;”
and “On the Separation of Church from State and School from Church.”11 Although the
statutes guaranteed the constitutional freedom of personal religious belief, they also
allowed for a government takeover of the important functions that religious
organizations heretofore performed, such as the education of children, and the
registration of births, deaths, and marriages. In addition, confiscation of the land
impoverished the religious organizations across the empire, especially the Orthodox
Church with its vast holdings.
Anatoly Lunacharsky turned out to be the ultimate beneficiary of the ejection of
religious organizations from classrooms statewide. In 1918 he was appointed the head
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of the newly created Soviet Department of Education. Ten years earlier, in 1908, he had
published a book titled Religion and Socialism. In that book Lunacharsky adopted a
softer tone about historical religions and offered a humanistic Feurbachian analysis,
arguing that Marxism should take over the “positive” aspects of traditional creeds in
order to give meaning to human life.
Not all religions elicited the same amount of attention from the politicians in the
Kremlin. Although there were attempts to curtail organized religion everywhere, for the
time being the Bolsheviks refrained from attacking the religions on the periphery that
were linked to national minorities.12 From the viewpoint of both the Communist ideology
and for practical consideration of political power, the ROC was the main enemy of the
regime. It gave political legitimation to the hereditary office of tsar who was considered
to be a God-anointed monarch, and a successor to the Christian emperors of ancient
Rome and Byzantium. The church was also a major landowner in the tsarist empire,
which controlled a significant amount of real estate, including churches and
monasteries, a fact that automatically made the organization a supporter of the
“exploiting classes.” At the beginning of the 20 th century, there were 37,000 Orthodox
parish churches, 720 cathedrals, and around 700 monasteries.13 There were about 100
million believers, 100,000 parish clergy, and 130 bishops in 67 dioceses.14 During the
Civil War, the church was understandably more sympathetic to the Whites and openly
hostile to the Reds’ atheism and materialism.
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Even more disturbing, perhaps, for the new rulers of the Russian Empire was
that the ROC acted on its own and attempted to get more autonomy from the state by
electing its own head, a patriarch. The position of patriarch had been abolished by Peter
the Great in 1700 in order to make the organization more subservient to the rising
power of the Europeanized Russian monarchy. After a two-hundred-year hiatus, the
new patriarch Tikhon was elected in 1917 at the Great All-Russian Ecclesiastical
Council.
Although all religious organizations that were tied in some way to the ruling elites
of the pre-revolutionary order were automatically blacklisted by the Bolsheviks as “class
enemies,” the ROC was the single most important enemy because of its size and its ties
to the Romanovs. The campaign against it was thus implemented soon after the
Bolshevik seizure of power. This campaign ran parallel to the more important campaign
to reduce the influence of traditional Great Russian nationalism, of which religion was
an important component.15
In February 1922, the government issued a decree ordering the churches to
surrender all the jewels and precious metals that they had in their possession.16
Ostensibly, the move was to alleviate the suffering caused by food shortages but, in
reality, it was intended to weaken the church and make it look bad should they refuse to
surrender their valuables in the midst of a national famine. The jewels and precious
metals had been mainly used for the decoration of church interior and to adorn the
icons. After the church authorities protested the measure, the Soviets moved against
them - 84 bishops and over a thousand priests were forced out of office.17
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Leon Trotsky (1879-1940), the intellectual mastermind of the Bolsheviks and
Lenin’s right-hand man, was put in charge of developing a plan that would lead to the
liquidation of religion in the empire. The Bolsheviks adopted the tested “divide and
conquer” formula: in March 1922 Trotsky unveiled his plan for the liquidation of the
institution. The first step was to arrest the patriarch. But the key role in the destruction of
the church was reserved for the newly-created group called “renovationists” who did not
differ much from the old church in terms of ritual and theology, but presented
themselves as more loyal to the new economic order. They were formally established as
a group on May 15, 1922.18 For Trotsky, however, who was certainly not a believer in
“renovationist” Christianity, the plan was a way to undermine the unity of the church by
creating a schism while at the same time compromising the international connections of
that institution. The “Renovationist” church was fully under control of the Soviet
authorities and would later be duly resolved in response to Stalin’s reform of 1943.
Patriarch Tikhon, the head of the Orthodox Church, was put under house arrest,
isolated, and died - seemingly of natural causes - on April 7, 1925. Following his death,
the authorities did not permit the election of the new patriarch although the church as a
body still continued to exist. In this way, ironically, the new authorities repeated the
political move made by Peter the Great centuries earlier.
Another significant move made by the new government was the establishment of
the so-called “League of the Militant Godless” in 1925, a theoretically independent body
aimed at conveying Communist views on religion to the masses. During the height of its
activities, the League published enormous amounts of anti-religious propaganda,
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including its periodical “Bezbozhnik” (“the Godless”). The institution would, conveniently,
cease its activities after Stalin’s decision to “revive” religion in 1943. It also created
“atheism museums,” and organized public events, etc. The interesting feature of this
ideological organization was that it defined itself exclusively in negative terms and
therefore had difficulty formulating an agenda of its own. “The Godless” were criticizing
religion but dedicated very little effort to describing the features of post-religious Soviet
society. Obviously, its main purpose was to counteract the propaganda activities of
religious organizations. But it also evidenced a belief that religious faith was a kind of
“primitive proto-science” and hence could be countered by the wide dissemination of
scientific information concerning various natural phenomena, which would be familiar to
the average Soviet citizen. The prolific Bolshevik publicist and organizer Yemelyan
Yaroslavsky (1878-1943) was appointed as its head; he took active part in intra-party
debates on religion and organized anti-religious campaigns.
Such drastic measures as Lenin’s secularization decrees, the formation of the
“progressive” Renovationist church, confiscations of valuables, and the creation of the
atheist propaganda league, curtailed the power of Orthodoxy but did not amount to a
full-blown attack on the church. From the first years of the Soviet era to the late 1920s,
the Orthodox Church remained one of the most powerful institutions in society.
Throughout the 1920s there was a tendency for older, more intransigent believers and
clerics to stick to the old ways and hence come into conflict with the Bolsheviks, while
the younger and more ideologically flexible groups attempted to reconcile traditional
religion with Marxism.
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Renovationism was not limited to Orthodoxy but emerged in relation to the other
world religions of the Empire. The Jadid reforming movement in Islamic Central Asia,
already active before the rise of Bolshevism, was on the rise, and the more intellectual
and socially conscious Buddhists had become prominent in Buryatia. To a large extent,
this situation was precipitated by the Bolsheviks themselves who, in some cases, were
either genuinely interested in this modernizing process or simply viewed it as a tool to
further weaken or divide traditional power groups and their clerical allies.
In the eyes of many loyal communists, organized religion in the USSR was not
only a “fifth column” that was unsatisfied with the change of rulers but, also, a pernicious
ideological institution competing with official materialist ideology. Although the onset of
the “New Economic Policy” (NEP) of the 1920s stabilized the country and allowed the
Orthodoxy to reestablish its contacts with the invigorated countryside, the efforts of the
new government weakened its power and prepared the group for the more violent
repression of the following years. By the late 1920s, the political situation in the USSR
changed drastically. The NEP, which allowed capitalist elements in the economy and
tolerated aspects of the past, brought new prosperity but also new fears that the Marxist
system was being undermined from below with the support of foreign capitalist
governments.
Vladimir Lenin - a great unifying figure and unquestionable leader - died in
January 1924. A power struggle ensued, until the centrist political group led by Joseph
Stalin (1878-1953) eliminated right wing and left wing opposition, drove many old
Bolsheviks in exile (including Leon Trotsky), or confined them to concentration camps in
Russia’s vast interior, or executed them after a series of staged trials.
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Joseph Stalin, the dictatorial ruler of the USSR from around 1928 until his death
in 1953, dominated the Eurasian political scene to a degree unequaled by any other
politician of the 20th century. In the eyes of many observers, the Soviet regime of that
era became known as “Stalinism” - a dictatorial system built around the opinions of one
man and the cult of his personality. From the late 1920s onward, Stalin had the last
word from industrialization of the nation and agricultural reforms to issues related to the
film industry, literary life, and, of course, religion.
Joseph Stalin, a non-Russian by blood (“inorodets” in the old imperial system),
was born on the outskirts of the empire in Gori, Georgia in 1878. He could have been of
partly Ossetian, but was mainly of Georgian ancestry. He was born in an impoverished
milieu, baptized in the Orthodox Church, and later enrolled as a student in a theological
seminary in Tiflis, the ancient capital of Georgia. After a few years there, he dropped out
and pursued a career as a Marxist revolutionary and publicist.
Despite having passed through a few years of seminary, Stalin was not an active
participant in discussions of religion during the 1920s. He was better known as an
expert on the nationalities question. Having grown up in the borderlands of the empire
among tremendous religious and ethnic diversity, Stalin surely understood religion as
well as nationalism. He had a chance to interact in Tbilisi and Baku with a variety of
ethnic/religious combinations, including Azeri Shia Muslims, Armenian Monophysites,
Russian and Georgian Orthodox, Sunni Chechens and Dagestanis, and surely other
more exotic groups as well.
Stalin let other Bolsheviks debate the question of religion and during his early
years, roughly from 1928 to 1942, he mainly followed Lenin’s old policies on religion. He
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was careful to stress his credentials as a faithful Leninist and was committed to the
deceased leader’s program of further reforming the economy along socialist lines,
resisting capitalist influence from the West, and purging culture and society of
counterrevolutionary ideas.
However, while adhering to the early Soviet line on religion, Joseph Stalin quietly
worked to undermine his political rivals, Trotsky first and foremost. Contrary to the
wishes of Lenin, who had wanted Trotsky to control the religious affairs, Stalin
organized a parallel organization that excluded Trotsky. The new organization was
called the “Commission for Antireligious Propaganda” (CAP) and it was formally
established on 19 October 1922, during the session of the Politburo. The Commission
was to establish links with various Soviet security services and report directly to the
Politburo. In creating this parallel structure and excluding Trotsky, Stalin and his allies
had a greater plan to seize power in the USSR.19
The marked differences between Leninist and Stalinist methods of rule became
prominent when Stalin decided to largely eliminate the old generation of Bolsheviks who
surrounded Lenin. After they perished or were otherwise removed from the political
scene, Stalin decided to implement more radical reforms that pushed the Leninist
program to new extremes. The decree of April 8, 1929 barred the religious
organizations from constructing new buildings, or from holding any social activities apart
from liturgical services.20 That calculated move prevented religion from spreading in the
newly urbanized centers that were developed by Stalin during his industrialization push.
More menacingly, by concentrating the Orthodox church in the rural areas, it was made
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vulnerable to Stalin’s increased hostility against the peasantry. The decision to issue the
degree was made on the eve of the greatest famine in the USSR; untold lives of
clergymen and their supporters were lost in that calamity and their churches were
destroyed or converted for other uses.
In order to understand the religious reforms in the USSR during the 1930s, one
has to view them in relation to two key Stalinist programs that were implemented
beginning in 1929 and lasting through the late 1930s: the collectivization drive (1929-33)
that radically transformed the countryside, and the Great Purges (1936-37) that
physically liquidated most of both the old elites who still lingered on from imperial
Russia, as well as the new Communist elites who had been established under Lenin.
Abandonment of the quasi-liberal NEP economic policy and the collateral
Collectivization drive that reached its apogee with the Great Famine of 1932-33 were
impossible without breaking down large organizations embedded within society. The old
peasant world, for centuries the main powerbase of the Orthodox Church and other
traditional religions, was undergoing unprecedented transformation. During the
collectivization drive, many wealthy and well-off farmers were categorized as “kulaks”
(literally “fists,” implying “dangerous enemies”) and either killed outright or dispossessed
and/or deported to the interior. They were often the pillars of Orthodoxy’s strength in the
country; their removal and replacement with government-assigned heads of newly
created large collective farms hurt the church badly. The closing of active churches
continued and was made easier by the chaos of collectivization.
The Great Purges of 1937-39 had radically transformed Soviet society by
exterminating millions of people, many of them members of old and new elites. It was
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one of the most violent episodes in modern history to occur during a time of peace. In
many ways it completed the revolutionary process begun by Vladimir Lenin. Whereas
Lenin had ordered the execution of the tsar and his family and ousted the Russian ruling
aristocracy, Stalin went beyond that and destroyed first the old agricultural society of the
empire and then what remained of its upper and middle classes, including his old
revolutionary comrades.
The Orthodox Church and other religions of the USSR were hit particularly hard.
Clergy, monks, religious intellectuals, and prominent laity members were arrested
indiscriminately and in large numbers. According to the Soviet internal statistics that
were later revealed to the wartime allies, by the time of the Second World War the
Soviet Union had 4,225 Orthodox Churches still functioning.21 Compared to the late
tsarist period (37,000 churches active on the eve of the revolution) those were indeed
the pitiful remains.
At the same time, the Soviet government continued to support the organizations
that were created to combat Orthodoxy and other forms of religious beliefs. The
Renovationist Church continued its shadowy existence as the organization that was
deemed more loyal to the authorities. At the same time, The League of the Militant
Godless were active as ever and in 1933 launched a campaign against the members of
the Communist party who had not broken their ties to the Orthodox church. The purges
supervised by the League added to the carnage of those years.
In fact, the League expanded its membership numbers during that period. In
1932, it counted 5.5 million members, which was 2 million more than the Soviet
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Communist Party.22 However, as the historian Daniel Peris claims in his Storming the
Heavens: History of the League of the Militant Godless, the organization entered a
period of crisis in the 1930s because it could not properly articulate its message. The
problem with the League as an ideological alternative to old religious organizations was
its inability to articulate its ideological mission; in other words, the League’s purpose
was negative - to combat religious belief - and it was lacking in any sort of positive
ideological message. The League was not an organization tasked with the promotion of
Bolshevik ideology or, at the very least, it continuously failed in its task, concentrating
instead on combating the most visible symbols of religiosity. This was partly because of
the lack of educated cadres, a problem that plagued most institutions of the Stalinist era
that had been exacerbated by the purges, and made more visible by the ideologically
complicated mission entrusted to the League.
The Renovationist Church continued to exist until 1946 as a substitute for the
canonical Orthodoxy. However, the reasons for its continued existence were unclear.
The leaders of the canonical church made a pledge of allegiance to the new regime
quite early on, so the Renovationists could not justify their existence on the basis of
loyalty alone. In addition, as the older generation of priests perished during the
bloodbath of the 1930s, the shadows of tsarist legacy seemed to quickly recede into the
past. The canonical Russian Orthodox Church started to appear virtually
indistinguishable from the younger Renovationist organization.
However brutal the legacy of the 1930s, the ROC survived the decade of
upheaval. Many clergymen had been purged as counterrevolutionaries and ideological
enemies, most churches had been closed or converted to other use, and the peasants
22
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that supported the institution had been swept away as “kulaks,” or herded into the
collective farms and stripped of property and influence. Yet the Church did seem to hold
tenaciously to its very existence. Not all the churchmen were liquidated, nor were all the
churches closed and prevented from holding services. The ROC continued to exist as
an organization with statutes and leadership, formally in communion with the other
Orthodox churches worldwide, although in reality it was stripped of any independence in
domestic or international affairs.
The Church was severely truncated but survived as an organization. However,
what remained were merely vestiges of the once powerful tradition. The view among the
ruling Communist elite, in line with the Marxist worldview, was that the traditional
religions were not viable in the post-revolutionary world and would wither away as older
generations die off. But perhaps even before the invasion Stalin and his associates had
a sense of a possible future usefulness of an institution that was defanged by purges
and completely compliant. In addition, the lack of powerful Orthodox powers in the
vicinity of the USSR, or possibly anywhere in the world with the exception of
politically-insignificant Romania, served to alleviate the ever-present fear of foreign
influence.
The campaign against Islam had been put on hold during the earlier years
because of the poor Bolshevik control of Islamic regions, particularly in the borderlands.
It was now in full swing. The campaign of “unveiling” (hujum) of women was a pretext
that was soon followed by the abolition of Sharia courts, destruction of cultic sites,
persecution of clergy and the Jadids (religious reformers), as well as the old and new

33

elites more generally.23 More than 14,000 Muslim clergy were repressed during the
purges of the 1930s.24
Buddhism fared even worse than Orthodoxy and Islam, the other two Soviet
world religions. Its institutional liquidation was nearly complete. In the Siberian region of
Buryatia all of the 47 functioning temples were closed in the late 1930s. By November
1938, all of the region’s 1,864 lamas (Buddhist priests) were arrested and most of them
were executed. More than one hundred Buddhist temples that existed in the western
region of Kalmykia before the Revolution were closed by 1940.25
In addition, Buddhist-majority Mongolia, a Soviet satellite, was taken over by the
local Communists and became a puppet state controlled by the USSR. Stalin pressed
for the elimination of the Mongolian Buddhist clergy, despite the initial reluctance of the
Mongolian Communists.26 By the time the Great Purges of 1936-1937 were over, it
seemed as if the world religions in the USSR had failed to find a modus vivendi vis-a-vis
Stalinist Marxism and would disappear completely and forever.
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Chapter 3: The USSR and the Vatican on the Eve of the German-Soviet War

In 1939, the USSR and Nazi Germany concluded the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.
This event resonated in political circles across the world and was a surprise for many
because Communism and Nazism had been ideological enemies from the start and had
made no secret of it. The Pact also created a disbalance of power in Europe. Many
independent states that had arisen in Eastern Europe in the period between the two
World Wars were now at the mercy of their powerful totalitarian neighbors. Poland,
which included many historically German and Ukrainian lands, was conquered and
divided between the USSR and the Nazi Reich in September 1939, setting off World
War Two, and bringing new religious communities within the USSR.
As the Soviet borders expanded westwards for the first time since the end of the
tsarist era, Moscow was able to directly control large territorial units with predominantly
Catholic populations. The empire of tsars had previously had its share of Catholics,
mostly in the western reaches of the country in what was historically Poland. However,
after the Revolution and the loss at the battle for Warsaw in 1920, the Bolsheviks lost
the formerly tsarist-controlled western lands with its majority Polish and Catholic
population. As a result, the Catholic Church, perhaps the largest centralized religious
organization in the world, was largely spared the excesses of the purges. That made it
even more of a problem for the Bolsheviks because it put the Catholics in a privileged
position vis a vis the Soviet religious organizations that had suffered heavily from the
purges.
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Political Catholicism rapidly became a major concern for the Bolsheviks, who
during the 1920s and 1930s were already in simmering conflict with the Vatican over the
faith of the Soviet Catholics. However, during the period between the foundation of the
USSR and the conclusion of World War Two, the Catholics constituted a small minority
of the Soviet population, and their political influence was easy to ignore. With the
annexation of new territories and populations from Poland and Hungary in 1939 (and
later re-annexation of them at the end of World War Two) the Soviets had to reckon with
a significant Catholic presence within the territory of the USSR. That encounter would
largely shape the course of the Soviet religions policy for the next decade and beyond.
An important characteristic of Bolshevik ideology was its uncompromising
character. Everyone either owed their allegiance to the enemy - the propertied classes
of capitalism, or to their allies - the working proletariat masses. The alliance of the
USSR with the Anglo-Americans did not allay Soviet suspicions of them. According to
this worldview, the capitalist countries worked together, seeking to encircle and destroy
the young Marxist state. Stalin only added fuel to his fire by proclaiming that as the new
Marxist-Leninist society developed, the conspiracy against it would “intensify,” and the
struggle with capitalism would become more vicious and implacable.27
If we fully understand the uncompromising worldview of the Bolsheviks who
believed that the entire world was united to fight them, we will be able to appreciate the
extent to which they tended to see ideologically unrelated phenomena as being
essentially unified. According to the Soviets, Hitler was but a product of capitalism and
served its ends like a puppet; Great Britain was not a real ally but the most dangerous
of all enemies, a dominant world capitalist power; and local Eastern European
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nationalists were not fighters for self-determination but the lackeys of capitalist ideology
and “bourgeois” nationalists. Religious organizations based in foreign countries were a
particularly malevolent force and there is no reason to think that the Bolsheviks wanted
to deal with them any differently than how they dealt with their domestic religious
organizations.
Among the foreign religious organizations, the Vatican remained the most
powerful and prominent one, the most centralized (an independent state), and the one
that was historically most active in Eastern Europe. It was thus natural for the Soviets, in
their ideological paranoia, to think that the Vatican would be able to take advantage of
the Nazi ideological efforts and the vacuum of power that was created in Europe by the
defeat of Nazis, which the Soviets strived to fill. It would also be natural for them to
assume that other “capitalist” democracies would be the Vatican’s natural allies in the
drive to weaken the world's only true socialist state.
The Soviet’s ideological paranoia made them uneasy vis-a-vis their wartime
allies, the USA, and the UK. According to that viewpoint, the victory in the Second
World War would not usher in the era of world peace and prosperity, as long as the
global forces of capitalism were not completely vanquished. As the Red Army soldiers
advanced further West, the Soviet world was to come into close contact with capitalist
forces that no longer existed in the USSR and that could be harmful for the young
communist society. As the soldiers walked across Europe, they were exposed to much
higher standards of living in western countries, and were impressed and not infrequently
enriched by it. That parade of Marxian “commodity fetishism” was a reason enough to
fear for their ideological integrity.
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The unpopularity of Nazism after its complete defeat in Europe neutralized, to a
significant extent, Nazi ideological efforts in eastern Europe. Priests and functionaries
who allied themselves with the Germans had to bear the stain of collaboration. Those
remaining within the USSR had to endure Soviet reprisal. Those abroad had to adapt
themselves to the post-war realities. The Vatican, however, stood poised to benefit from
the ideological vacuum created by the eclipse of Nazism, especially if the atheistic
Soviets were prevented from conquering Europe.
The Roman Catholic Church claimed the adherents of millions of believers
across Europe. Its positions were the strongest in Poland, but it had many
well-organized communities elsewhere, including in the Baltics and Ukraine. Although
the Vatican had tried to avoid conflict with Nazi Germany by concluding the so-called
Reichskonkordat with Berlin in 1933, just a few years later it was ready to dissociate
itself from the Nazis and publicly attack their ideology. On March 14, 1937 Pope Pius XI
published an encyclical “Mit Brennender Sorge,” titled in German and dedicated in equal
parts to the denunciations of the Nazi violations of the 1933 treaty and to the ideological
excesses of National Socialism. In that document Pope Pius XI emphasized the
incompatibilities between the Nazi ideology and Christianity, denouncing the myth of the
blood and what it saw as Nazi “paganism.” He also contrasted the Christian God with
“pre-Christian Germanic” destiny that had been propagated by Nazi rulers.28 He
stressed at many points in the encyclical that race or nation (or state) cannot be exalted
beyond the moral laws of Christianity and he emphasized the Judaic background of the
Christian religion and the Catholic church. Such a document amounted to a sustained
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attack on the foundations of Nazi doctrine and its imperial racial project that, at least to
some extent, nullified the stain of the 1933 Reichskonkordat and made it more difficult
for the enemies of the Vatican to tie the Church to Hitler.
At the same time the Roman Catholic Church remained at odds with the Soviets.
The Vatican was as quick to condemn Communism as it was Nazism; just five days
after the release of the encyclical “Mit Brennender Sorge,” the Papal See issued an
encyclical condemning “atheistic Communism” entitled “Divini Redemptoris” (1937).29 In
that document Pius XI attacked Communism as disruptive of natural order and a “false
messianism.” “Divini Redemptoris” summarized a half-dozen earlier encyclicals dating
from the latter decades of the XIX century written by Pius IX and Leo XIII explicitly
against the teachings of Communism. According to “Divini Redemptoris,” the essential
characteristic of Communist ideology is the belief in “the blind forces… of matter (that)
moves towards the final synthesis of the classless society.”30 In contrast to the
“disproven” Communist doctrine, Pius XI emphasized the role of “moral responsibility”
and “belief in God” as a way to build a better society founded on the Catholic idea of
“social justice.” The document is a theological critique of the Marxist materialist
foundations of Soviet political ideology from the philosophical standpoint of Christian
idealism.
In the course of a single week in 1937 then, the Vatican publicized a systematic
ideological vision that not only stressed the Church’s points of conflict with both Nazi
and Soviet ideological projects, but also admonished the faithful to oppose both “pagan”
Nazism and “atheistic” Communism. This move did not make life less complicated for
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Catholics in the German Reich and the USSR, but it strategically positioned the Vatican
to take advantage of any military or ideological losses suffered by the rulers of Germany
and the USSR in the upcoming war.
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Chapter 4: The Second World War and Nazi religious policies in the occupied
USSR and Eastern Europe

On 22nd of June 1941, German armies crossed the German-Soviet border and
initiated war with the USSR. This event shocked Moscow’s ruling elite. Only a couple of
years earlier in 1939, the USSR and Nazi Germany had signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop
pact, which allowed them to participate in the partition of Poland and some other
Eastern European lands. The treaty made it possible for the USSR to expand westward,
annexing areas in Eastern Europe that had millions of Catholic and Orthodox believers
and that included areas with large Jewish populations. The onset of the Soviet-German
war in 1941, however, largely nullified those gains. The Red Army suffered defeats in
the initial stages of the war, and it was pushed far to the east.
Soviet policies in the newly occupied lands did not gain them popularity there. On
the contrary, the Soviet-style Bolshevik reforms and accompanying violence that were
implemented between 1939 and 1941 made large swathes of the local populace,
including the local elites, fearful and mistrustful of Moscow.31
Although the German occupation in the years that followed was in some ways
even more brutal than the preceding Soviet period, the opportunity was created for the
Nazis to test their propaganda and social engineering methods in the territory they had
conquered. Besides the lands that were acquired by the USSR in 1939 (and therefore
were not subject to the reforms described in the preceding chapters), the Germans were
able to quickly occupy a far larger area of the western USSR, including the entirety of
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Belarus, Ukraine, as well as parts of southern and western Russia proper. The Germans
advanced so far east that they were able to make meaningful contact with Buddhist
Kalmyks near Volga, as well as various Muslim and Orthodox nations of the Caucasus,
who also became the objects of Nazi propaganda and, in many cases, military
auxiliaries.32
The Second World War and the German occupation of the western USSR
constituted the immediate context for the change in the Soviet religious policy. The long
chain of progressively more violent political experiments in social engineering,
international isolation, Marxist experiments, forced secularization, and the pursuit of
political utopia quickly came to end when the armies of Nazi Germany crossed the
border and put most of the western USSR under their control. A completely different
new ideological and political order was imposed on the newly acquired lands. This
situation necessitated an appropriate response from Moscow. In the initial stages of the
war, it was not entirely clear if the Germans would be able to take Moscow and conquer
the USSR all the way to the Ural Mountains. However, once the tide shifted with the
German defeat at Stalingrad and later at Kursk, the immediate task of the Bolsheviks
changed from surviving the war to reconquering and reintegrating the “lost” western
lands.
German occupation of western Soviet land lasted only a few years. Nevertheless,
it changed the societies in Ukraine, Poland, and the Baltics in drastic ways, both by
means of radical violence and genocide, but also by cultural influences from abroad,
however distorted those were by Nazism. The societies were affected by exposure to
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the western way of doing things after a long period of Soviet isolationism. As a result of
the war, the Holocaust, and the forced resettlements (as well as earlier Soviet purges),
the population of those regions became homogenized and overwhelmingly Orthodox,
with pockets of Catholics and surviving Jews. In addition, some of those regions were
never a part of the pre-Soviet Russian Empire and never a part of the Soviet Union.
They had not been occupied by the USSR in 1939 during the interlude between the
signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the onset of German hostilities in 1942.
That amplified the effect of Nazi occupation as the Soviet ideological hold on the lands
was not sufficiently solidified to resist the changes brought about by the occupation.
According to historian Stephen Miner, even after the tide of war turned against
Germany, the Soviet leadership looked at the inevitable re-incorporation of those
territories with a great deal of anxiety. Not only was anti-Russian and anti-Communist
animosity a factor, but the vestiges of Western influence were lingering, and even
spreading. This was a problem both from the ideological point of view and from the point
of view of changing geopolitics, especially in the light of the uneasy relationship
between the USSR and the Allies. Politically active Christians, both in the UK and the
USA, who were concerned about global Christianity, balked at the atheistic nature of the
Soviet regime and the violent persecution of the Russian clergy. Various expat Russian
Orthodox groups in the western lands beyond the reach of the USSR were radically
anti-Soviet, some having gone so far as to side with the Nazis before and during the
war.
To take advantage of the Soviet anti-religion policies, Nazi Germany had
declared an international “Crusade” against the Soviet Union, even naming their main
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military operation in the East in honor of the German Crusader king “Barba Rossa,” who
had drowned in Anatolia during the crusade. Hitler and his followers were principled
enemies of the atheistic Soviet state and developed an ideology that had very few
points in common with Soviet Marxist-Leninist doctrine. In order to buttress the support
for their anti-Soviet ideological and military effort, the Nazis permitted the re-opening of
the Orthodox churches and allowed them to conduct services. They also created a
variety of organizations to control popular religious sentiment.
Ideologically, the revival of religious life after the arrival of the Germans put the
Soviets in a difficult spot. The continued Soviet practice of restraint on church activities
compared unfavorably with the active religious life in the German-occupied lands. The
Germans and their allies undermined many years of Soviet anti-religious campaigns by
lessening the restrictions on religious activities and encouraging the formation of new
religious groups. Those relaxations were enthusiastically received by the local
populations. In fact, one can speak of a true “revival” of church life in the territories
controlled by the Axis powers.
Romania entered the war on Hitler’s side. It occupied the southwestern part of
the USSR that included Moldova, southeastern Ukraine, and the port city of Odessa. A
non-Slavic Orthodox nation that was hostile to the USSR, Romania immediately took
advantage of the situation on the ground and subordinated newly legalized Orthodox
communities to the ecclesiastical authorities in Bucharest.33
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In addition, the predominantly Orthodox lands of Volhynia in western Ukraine had
come under the rule of Poland after the end of the Polish-Soviet war in 1921. As a
result, the holdings of the Russian Orthodox Church and its clergy in Poland had not
been affected by the famine of 1933 and the Great Purges of the late 1930s. At the
beginning of World War Two, the large number of Russian Orthodox Churches still
active were located in the west, under Polish control, far away from the ethnic Russian
Orthodox lands.
In some way the victorious USSR found itself transported into its own past. The
aspects of the past that were eradicated in the USSR in the 1930s persisted in its
borderlands. Those “capitalist” traditions constituted a threat to the Soviet way of life,
and it was not clear how they could be censored or prevented from being used as an
ideological weapon. The period of the German Nazi occupation was not remembered
fondly by most of the population, but their legacy was retained in many different ways,
providing the basis for anti-Soviet sentiments.
One of the ways to deal with the (re)incorporation of the western borderlands
was to repeat the formula of the 1930s, i.e., to plan and conduct massive waves of
arrests, deportations, and executions of social elites starting with the ruling strata of the
local Communist parties. There is some evidence that such a measure was seriously
considered at the highest level, long after Germany itself was defeated and occupied.
Some members of the Soviet leading circles advocated for a comprehensive purge in
the territories that had been subjected to Nazi rule during the war. As late as May 1947,
long after the German defeat, Kaganovich pushed for a comprehensive purge of
Ukrainian political and cultural elites, which were comparable to the campaigns of the
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1930s. They would start in the same way, with the public trials of top Communist
functionaries in the republic.34 Nevertheless, the plans were shelved. Stalin was
allegedly opposed to being personally involved “in a quarrel with the Ukrainians.”35
Perhaps he thought that the victory in the war and the violent reforms of the western
territories already undertaken by the Soviets from 1939 through 1945 had had their
effect.36
But what was the extent of the “religious revival” under German rule and can one
even speak about the “revival” in the ghastly colonial regime that the Nazis instituted in
the East? Historians and eyewitnesses alike often observed that the German
occupation of the Soviet lands was welcomed by many of the locals, some of whom still
remembered the Germans during the First World War or even of the generation before
that; however, the subsequent events and the systemic racism inflicted on the local
non-Germanic racial groups, especially the Jews and the Slavs, very soon made them
realize that in many ways the Nazi system was even more deadly than the realities of
the Soviet rule.
The biggest problem for the Nazis and their collaborators in the East with the
restoration of Christian organizations was due to the fundamentally anti-Christian
foundations of Nazi ideology. Hitler was not a Christian in a conventional sense of this
word. Like many of the members of his party, he was influenced by tribal paganism, by
the religions of ancient Greece and Rome, and by the mythology of the Germanic
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sagas, as nostalgically portrayed in the operas of his favorite composer, Ludwig
Wagner.
Many German Christians tried to survive as best as they could. They adapted
themselves, to various extents, to the new government and its racial doctrines. Many
resisted. Some were in conflict with the authorities. In any case, there was no
wide-scale purge in Germany itself, but many of the faithful had some worries about the
future of their faith in the new Reich, particularly in the light of Christianity’s Judaic roots.
Aside from Hitler, there were other members of the ruling clique who were
religiously and mystically inclined, not towards Christianity but rather towards different
varieties of folkish, blood-and-soil based doctrines that constituted a loosely
(in)coherent non-codified system. Himmler carried a copy of the Hindu sacred text
“Bhagavad Gita” (The Song of the Lord) with him at all times and imagined himself an
incarnation of an ancient German king. On July 1, 1935, Himmler met with his SS
associates in Berlin to found the “Society for the Study of the History of Primeval Ideas.”
Later it was renamed the “Ahnenerbe” and became a quasi-historical party think-tank
that collected information on the ancient beliefs of the “Aryans” in order to implement a
new religious system in the Reich, or at least attempt to do so if Himmler’s influence
were to persist and spread.37 However, Himmler’s efforts in that direction were often met
with derision from other Nazis who were atheistic and suspicious of obscure mystical
doctrines, or simply uninterested in Ariosophy.
From the very beginning of the war, the German policy on religion was carried
out differently in Germany and in the East. The East in the Nazi imaginary was a land of
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brutish, sub-human beasts, who had to be managed for the greater good of the future
Germany.38 To that end, several competing political bodies were founded in the
occupied lands in order to re-engineer Eastern Europe all the way to the Ural
Mountains, the future eastern border of the Reich. The enterprise was in no way subject
to the laws that prevailed in Germany; complete freedom was given to the Nazi rulers in
order to reshape local societies.
Regardless of the lawlessness that was thus created by placing the East under
control of several competing administrative bodies, the Germans were successful in
transplanting their own brand of dictatorial tyranny. The principle of “working towards the
Führer” was often the only guide to the local Nazi agents, who frequently quarreled with
one another, ignored each other commands, and treated the locals as dispensable
elements in those power struggles.
An old Nazi party member and longtime Hitler associate, Alfred Rosenberg,
became a nominal head of the German occupation government in the East. Among the
Nazis, he was considered to be an expert in eastern affairs due to his background as a
Baltic German and his familiarity with all things “Russian.” Unlike other Nazis,
Rosenberg understood that the populations of the European part of the USSR were
divided into many ethnic groups, including many who were resentful towards Russian
imperialism and ethnic chauvinism. Rosenberg had his own vision of the fundamental
“Eastern land” policy that consisted in consolidating Soviet ethnic minorities against the
“Great Russian” dominant group. His vision of the East was that of a colonized land,
dismembered along ethnic lines and easy to govern.39
38

Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 161-63.
Wolodymyr Kosyk, ed., The Third Reich and the Ukrainian Question: Documents 1934-1944 (London:
Ukrainian Central Information Service, 1991), Document 13, 39.
39

48

The Edict of Toleration, the key legislative initiative on religion, was promulgated
by Rosenberg's “Ostraum” government on June 19, 1942.40 It went through several
drafts before publication and was reviewed by such influential German administrators in
the area as Koch and Lohse. The initial draft of the Edict simply stated that everyone in
the occupied East had freedom of religious belief and freedom to form religious
associations with like-minded worshippers. Later, various provisions were added after
hardliners demanded that the language of the Edict be toned down, and that each local
religious organization submit to a local investigation in order to verify its political
reliability.
Rosenberg mainly supported the division of the Protestant and Orthodox
Churches along ethnic lines. In the case of Orthodox Christianity, he promoted
Ukrainian and Byelorussian groups hostile to the “Great” Russians - a policy well in line
with his idea of the ethnic breakdown and colonization of the USSR. Rosenberg was
hostile to both the Russian Orthodox Church and the Vatican, and he aimed to use local
religious groups to weaken the population’s ties to both of those religious structures.
Despite the lofty language of the Edict, it was often ignored by the local German
administrators (such as the officials of Koch’s Reichskommissariat administration) and
SS functionaries who acted as they saw fit and who did not have to report directly to
Rosenberg because of the decentralized system of Nazi rule. Despite the fact that the
Edict offered these Churches the right to organize, the actual policy adopted by the SS
and local administrations sought to paralyze any larger religious structures and reduce
contacts between religious communities as much as possible. Larger church structures,
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such as the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, were partly suppressed as they
grew bigger and more influential.41
Nevertheless, the Edict was a powerful catalyst that sparked a wide-spread
religious revival. More and more churches were reopened. The horrors and
uncertainties of the war seemed only to fuel the fervor of believers. Orthodox
Christianity was no longer de facto banned, and in some areas that were never ravaged
by the reforms and violence of the 1920s and 1930s, such as Volhynia, it was both
vigorous and widespread. In addition, the German army (Wehrmacht) had its own way
of managing the lands “liberated” from the Communists. As they entered one conquered
town after the other, the German soldiers often reopened churches, cleaned and
reconstructed them, and even used them for their own religious purposes. Such policy
was frowned upon by Hitler and the more ideological Nazis, but the tension and
competition between the army and the colonial administration in the East, together with
the importance of the Wehrmacht in an on-going war, allowed the generals to do what
they wanted within their sphere of territorial command.
After the Germans were defeated by the Red Army and driven from the territories
of the USSR, they left behind not only widespread destruction and hatred, but also an
ideological legacy. Segments of the population who had collaborated with the Nazis had
been influenced by their ideas. Those who had been exposed to the realities of the
colonial Nazi government and who had, for years, resisted their rule were now left with
the chaotic freedom of statelessness and anarchy, a reality for many locales after the
war. This situation was deeply problematic for Stalin and his followers, who
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contemplated the best way to re-organize life and re-incorporate the recaptured
territories into the USSR.
In the area of religious life, Stalin had to contend with the multitude of still
functioning churches of various denominations in all of the reconquered regions. He
also had to deal with a variety of religious groups that were either created under Nazi
auspices or that had ancient roots of their own, which were greatly affected by war but
retained much of their vigor. The enemies of the USSR, both real and imaginary, were in
a position to benefit from the abortive religious reforms that the Reich had instituted in
the West. No one was in a better position to benefit than the Vatican. Italy had been
liberated by the Western Allies and the Pope was clearly outside the Soviet sphere of
influence while millions of his subjects in Eastern and Central Europe came under the
direct control of the Soviet military and later civil authorities.
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Chapter 5: Wartime Concordat and Religious Reform, 1943

After the purges and anti-religious campaigns of the 1920s and 1930s, it was
perhaps surprising to many that Joseph Stalin would reverse his course and help all
three world religions to re-establish themselves in the USSR. In 1943, however, in the
midst of the Second World War, this is exactly what had taken place. To further his plans
in that direction, Stalin took a decisive first step by deciding to personally meet with the
ROC’s leaders in his office.
The key meeting took place on September 4, 1943 in the Kremlin.42 The day
before, the three key representatives of the ROC, Sergei Stagorodskiy, Alexiy
Simansky, and Nicolai Yarushevich, were notified that they were about to meet with the
authorities in Moscow. Stalin underwent a final briefing before the high-profile meeting.
Accompanying him was his right-hand man Vyacheslav Molotov as well as Georgiy
Karpov (1898-1967), whom Stalin had appointed the same month as the head of the
newly created Soviet for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church. Karpov was to
remain the head of that council until 1960, long after Stalin was dead. In 1944, a parallel
structure called the Soviet for the Affairs of Religious Cults was created; it was oriented
towards the minority religions of the USSR.43
Karpov proved a diligent chronicler, duly recording the meeting between Stalin
and the hierarchs in his office.44 Before the meeting Stalin quizzed Karpov on the
international influence of the Orthodoxy and its historical ties to various international
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structures. The hierarchs were invited in and Stalin talked to them about various matters
including his seminary past. The ensuing remarks about “our seminarian turning into the
Soviet generalissimo” elicited smiles from the dictator. The Church was promised
expanded rights and material support from the state.
The Soviet for the Affairs of Religious Cults that Karpov was to lead was clearly
reminiscent of the Synod council established by Peter the Great in 1721 for the same
purpose - to control the church. Unlike Peter the Great’s reform that ultimately abolished
the position of the Patriarch, this time, on September 12, 1943, the Soviets enthroned
the Patriarch as the formal leader of the church, shortly after a separate meeting of the
hierarchs on September 8, 1943.45
The Orthodox Church was resurrected from the ashes. It was able to enthrone a
new patriarch and move into the building of the former German embassy. Its longtime
adversaries, the League of Militant Godless and the Renovationist Church, were no
longer a threat. However, as the appointment of Karpov and the creation of the Soviet
on the Affairs of the Church demonstrated, Stalin had no reason to give the newly
reinvigorated Church any real autonomy. It was to remain but an extension and an
instrument of the Soviet state in an upcoming battle with the Vatican.
With the approach of the Second World War and the resulting decisive victories
of the Soviets and their Western Allies, the Vatican found itself in an advantageous
situation. Although many traditional Catholic societies, most notably Poland, were bled
dry by both the Soviets and the Nazis, the main traditional adversary of Rome in the
East, the Russian Orthodox Church, was critically weakened. At the same time, most
centers of Catholic power remained beyond the reach of the Red Army in western and
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southern Europe. In this way, a religious vacuum of power was created that the Vatican
was potentially able to exploit.
On the other hand, the crisis of fascism and Nazism in Europe had created
another vacuum of power further West. Roman Catholicism, as a traditional European
creed, could appeal to those who were disillusioned by radical right-wing ideologies but
still bitterly opposed to Communism. Some Catholics were active in the resistance both
inside and outside Germany and could now claim the victory as their own. Most
importantly, they had subordinate structures within the Soviet zone, some of them
hundreds of years old.
The Uniate Church in Ukraine, also known as the Ukrainian Catholic Church or
the Greek Catholic Church of Ukraine, was by far the largest Catholic structure within
the predominantly Orthodox parts of Eastern Europe. It was principally in the areas of
western Ukraine that were only recently joined to the USSR, and it had never been a
part of the Russian Empire. Other areas such as Galicia and Transcarpathia, and parts
of Transylvania, were originally converted from Orthodoxy to Catholicism hundreds of
years earlier yet retained the eastern rituals and, to some extent, the mystical theology
of the Orthodox Church. Over the years, the Greek Catholic Church had become a
symbol of national identity in the areas ruled by foreigners. During the war, it became
known for opposing both German and Soviet brutalities.
The vacuum of religious power in the USSR was by no means an abstract thing.
The number of churches and monasteries both of Orthodox and Catholic persuasion
was much higher in the western parts of the USSR, which included the “Great Russian”
ethnic homeland, than in the eastern parts. In addition, the percentage of Catholics in
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the west was much higher, and they were more closely linked to local conspiratorial
organizations. Of the biggest concern to the Soviets was the Greek Catholic Church that
was mostly active in the western parts of Ukraine that had been joined to the USSR in
1942 and again in 1945. That religious organization had become a symbol of Ukrainian
nationalism and anti-Soviet resistance before and during the war. It was a political
power to be reckoned with.
There were, of course, also Roman Catholic communities in the western lands
conquered by the advancing Red Army, most prominently the Catholics of Lithuania.
However, they were not numerous and were traditionally considered “inorodtsy (i.e.,
ethnic aliens) by the Russians. The Ukrainian Catholic Church, in contrast, was from its
inception created as a Catholic structure aimed at conversion of the Orthodox Eastern
Slavs.
In order to absorb such a large community of Catholics, Joseph Stalin decided in
1943 to revive the Russian Orthodox Church, which had been reduced to a bare
existence, and to extend its presence to the westernmost regions of the USSR. Stalin
was well-prepared for such an offensive. His earlier experience as a party specialist in
national and minority issues, as well as his past in the multicultural Caucasus, made
him understand the extent and threat of Ukrainian nationalism in the newly joined
western provinces. To a large extent, western Ukrainian national identity was centered
on the Ukrainian Catholic Church - an allegiance that only grew stronger during the
period of national subjection to Polish and Austrian rule. The Catholic clergy also
formed the political and cultural elite of the region as many Ukrainian aristocrats had
been Polonized and Germanized over the centuries. Subduing this elite by
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subordinating it to a Russian church loyal to Moscow and repressing the dissenters
would be a big blow against Ukrainian nationalism.
However, the other factor that loomed large in the minds of the Soviet elite was
the international role that the Ukrainian church played as a subordinate structure of the
Vatican. Created in the early modern period, the Uniate church was initially spread over
much larger Eastern Slavic territories. In his seminary days Stalin had taken classes on
the “spiritual and knightly orders,” on “the decline of the Papacy,” and others, which
allowed him to understand the history of the global competition between the two
churches quite well.46 Now, he wanted to get rid of the Ukrainian national and religious
problems in one stroke, i.e., to destroy the support for Ukrainian nationalism and,
perhaps more important politically, to put a limit to the ambitions of the Vatican in the
“Great Russian” heartland of the USSR.
In 1929, the Pontifical Russian College of Saint Thérèse of the Child Jesus
(Pontificium Collegium Russicum Sanctae Theresiae A Iesu Infante) was founded in
Rome. Its official reason for existence was to cater to the refugees from the Soviet
atheist state, but the real goal was the strengthening of the Catholic presence in the
USSR at the time when its traditional religious competitors were severely weakened. In
practice, however, it ended up including mostly Ukrainians and Belarusians who had
worked in the eastern Catholic regions during the war, and very few “Great” Russians,
whose homeland was further east and who constituted the ethnic core of the ROC.
However, it remained clear that the final goal of the College was not to contain the
Catholic power on the eastern reaches of Poland but to expand deeper into historical
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Russia.47 For the Bolsheviks and Joseph Stalin, who were always concerned about the
threat of ideological penetration, the College’s plan was a clear challenge.
The head of the Ukrainian Catholic Church before and during the war was Andriy
Scheptytsky, a Pole by birth but a Ukrainian churchman by choice. In popular memory
he is often perceived as a Ukrainian nationalist, but his ambitions stretched much
further. True to the historic mission of the Uniate church, Sheptytsky wanted it to expand
further into eastern lands, including into the “Great” Russian heartland, and he made
trips to Moscow to that end before the war.48
Conveniently for the Soviets, Scheptytsky died before the decision to absorb the
Ukrainian Catholic Church was made. But the legacy of his missionary efforts, his
support for Ukrainian nationalism, and his problematic relationship with the occupying
Nazis were there to stay. Barring a massive postwar purge, the only way to deal with his
legacy for the Soviets was to use the clergy and the properties of the Ukrainian Catholic
Church to grow the Russian Orthodox Church, which by the end of the Second World
War had been much weakened by the decades of state persecution and which had few
churches of its own. It was an act of institutional cannibalism. Together with the
Orthodox properties in Volhynia and in Bukovina, the real estate of Ukrainian Catholics
played a key role in the institutional resurgence of the Russian Orthodox Church.
In 1949, ten years after the first attempts of Sovietization of the western
provinces and after several years of the Nazi wartime occupation, the Ukrainian
Catholic Church was completely merged with the Russian Orthodox Church. According
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to official Soviet reports, 3,001 Uniate churches, 1,242 priests and 463 deacons and
1,018 minor deacons “rejoined” the Orthodox church.49 Only twelve Catholic
monasteries with 306 monks and nuns remained as the centers of pro-Vatican
sentiment, but they were closed by the authorities later during that same year.
Catholicism in the western USSR disappeared for decades, seemingly forever, while the
ROC obtained a massive presence in the lands it had largely been absent from for
centuries.
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Chapter 6: Joseph Stalin’s Worldview and the Russian Orthodox Church

Joseph Stalin’s life and death was much discussed by his enemies and admirers
both inside and outside the realm that he controlled. There are now a number of
biographies of Stalin, with a new one coming off the press every few years or so. And
yet, with all this wealth of information, many aspects of Stalin’s worldview are not yet
fully explored.
From a viewpoint of ecclesiastical history, Joseph Stalin was clearly a major
figure and a reformer. He destroyed and then revived major world religions that had
existed in the state of institutional continuity across Eurasia for centuries, or for a
millennium or more. And he did it all within a few decades of coming to power. Yet the
least explored area of his biography pertains to his years as a seminarian, right before
his “conversion” to Marxism.
As was mentioned earlier, Joseph Stalin did not take a central part in the party
debates and policy-making on the subject of religion during the 1920s. In the 1930s,
however, as he assumed absolute power and liquidated any kind of opposition to his
rule, Stalin also became the final authority on the question of organized religion in the
USSR. He decimated the Russian Orthodox Church, imprisoned its clerics, liquidated
centuries-long Catholic institutional presence among the Eastern Slavs, forced the
closure of every Buddhist temple in the larger part of Central Asia, and de-veiled Muslim
women and disempowered Sharia courts and other aspects of Islam everywhere in the
Soviet empire.
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Later, in 1943, pressured by exhaustion from fighting the war in the West, Stalin
relented and instituted a series of reforms. These reforms not only gave the Orthodox
Church powers it had not possessed during the tsarist era, such as the election of the
national church leader, the Patriarch - a position abolished by Peter the Great, but it
also expanded the Church to regions that the tsars had long desired to make
Orthodox.50 In the same year, he also instituted parallel reforms related to other
religions. These reforms lead to the opening of the first post-1930s Buddhist temple in
the USSR in Buryatia on December 11, 1945, which is still functioning, and the
formation of a central authority (muftiate) for the Soviet Muslims in Tashkent.51 The
reform of the Orthodox Church in 1943 is now referred to by historians in the
post-Stalinist era as Stalin’s “concordat” with Orthodoxy, in an attempt to create a
parallel with the infamous Hitler’s “concordat” (i.e., the deal with the Vatican), signed ten
years earlier in 1933.52 Yet the comparison is misleading because the term “concordat”
is a Roman Catholic term and does not have the same meaning in the Orthodox East as
it does in the Latin West. More importantly, it is impossible to talk about the reforms of
1943 as a single “concordat.” Rather it was a number of “concordats,” conceived along
the same lines and concluded with all the world religions of the empire. Nevertheless,
the “concordat” with the Orthodox church was the most significant of them, owing to the
Orthodoxy's disproportional numerical strength compared to other Soviet religions.
Such a drastic turn from violence and destruction to resurrection and state
promotion, from suppression to appropriation, is bound to raise some questions, for
example, “Why did Stalin change his mind?” or “Why did he do it in 1943?” The answer
50

Miner, Stalin’s Holy War, 163-205.
Tasar, Soviet and Muslim, 111.
52
Miner, Stalin’s Holy War, 126.
51

60

to the second question is more situational and was addressed by Miner and others in
their publications, and agreed to in this thesis. According to Miner, etal., in 1943 Joseph
Stalin realized that he would win the war, but he also became acutely aware of the
global political challenges that such victory would bring, above all the increased contact
of the Soviet populations with the anti-Soviet elements from the West, such as the
Vatican.
Joseph Stalin did not publish important works on religion. This does not mean
that he did not have a well-formed opinion of religion as a political reality. The most
interesting documents that shed light on the development of his ideas on religion and
political power are the ones that relate to his student years from 1894-99 when he
studied at the Tiflis Seminary in the capital of his native country of Georgia. Those five
years were important for the young Stalin. He arrived in the capital as a young devout
man from the provincial city of Gori, who hardly spoke any Russian. But he was already
a very studious individual, and he remained an avid reader and learner during his later
life as well. And yet despite the importance of those years, there is very little attention
paid by the biographers to Stalin’s studies at the seminary. For example, Hiroaki
Kuromiya in his biography of Stalin dismisses the entire matter with one sentence, “It is
often said that Soso's Marxist learning was shallow, or at least was deeply affected by
the simplistic catechism of his ecclesiastical education.”53 The implication is that Stalin’s
[Soso’s] education was “simplistic,” and he was little more than a “catechumen” during
his seminary years. And yet Kuromiya states that Stalin did seriously consider becoming
a professor at one point in his life. Stalin’s years of seminary constituted the sum total of
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his exposure to academia and was anything but simplistic, but it did affect his
understanding of Marxism and related disciplines.
Stephen Kotkin, in his multi-volume biography of Stalin strikes a more
conciliatory note towards the Tiflis Seminary and declares that “the Orthodox
churchmen gave the entire Russian empire most of its intelligentsia through both their
offspring and their teaching.”54 Yet he stops short of explaining what this phrase actually
means. Kotkin does mention that the Tiflis Seminary and the Rabbinical School in Wilno
were two ecclesiastic schools that produced a number of important Russian
revolutionaries. But Kotkin attributes it more to the discipline and organizational skill that
such places imparted and not to the strength of the curriculum.55 It is true that Stalin’s
ecclesiastical past was not a secret. It was known to his party colleagues and was never
seriously held against him. Others, such as the infamous Sergei Nechaev, who was the
leader of the radical revolutionary organization “People’s Revenge,” and the founder of
modern left-wing terrorism, as well as the personal hero of Vladimir Lenin, was also a
simple man from the provinces who was educated at the Russian seminary in the city of
Smolensk.
Much of current scholarship de-emphasizes the seminary curriculum and the
literature that shaped Stalin’s thinking about religion and politics while he was a student
at the Seminary. There are strong reasons to think that it was during that time that the
intellectual foundations were laid for his legislative initiative in 1943. We are lucky to
have fairly detailed seminary records with the description of the courses that Stalin took,
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his grades, the grades of his fellow students, topics that were discussed in class, and
even library records that document what Stalin read in his free time.
Leon Trotsky was responsible for introducing the idea of Stalin as a “gray blur” in
the party, a bureaucrat who was not notable for any intellectual contributions but was
simply an efficient manipulator who worked his way to the top by means of bureaucratic
machinations, and carefully removing his opponents one by one. In his influential
biography of Stalin, Trotsky spends a significant amount of time discussing his seminary
years; but he falls short of real inquiry and mostly limits himself to anecdotal accounts of
Stalin as recorded by his various Georgian associates of the period.56 In general,
Trotsky emphasized Stalin’s role as a soulless bureaucrat and not as an intellectual,
and his coverage of the seminary years followed that line of thinking.
The view that Stalin was not an intellectual was shared by many
contemporaries. Perhaps it is true that Stalin’s intellectual inclinations were less
noticeable than that of Bukharin and Trotsky, who were the intellectual darlings of the
party. Stalin did not have a reputation as an effective public speaker. He rose through
the ranks thanks to the help of Lenin, who liked Stalin’s organizational ability. Stalin
himself aspired to the status of a great military commander, but he undoubtedly
considered himself an ideologist as well. His early writings concern the national
question, and he was somewhat of an authority in the party on this topic.
The Caucasus region of imperial Russia where Stalin had grown up was
especially well-suited to absorb information about the way religion and culture
intersected. It was notable for its ethnic, linguistic, and cultural diversity. Stalin himself
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was born an Orthodox Christian. He was a Georgian, from a historically Orthodox nation
that had converted to Orthodoxy much earlier than Russia itself. Besides Georgians, the
Caucasus was home to Armenians (a separate Christian denomination), Shia Muslim
Azeris, and various Sunni nations such as the Chechens. In the north Caucasus lived
the descendants of the Russian Cossacks who were Orthodox Christians, as well as the
Buddhist Kalmucks. Unlike the more religiously homogeneous areas of the Christian
West, the Caucasus was an excellent place to reflect on the meaning of religious
diversity, and especially on the interrelation between religion and ethnicity. Religion in
that region was more often than not a tribal marker - something that distinguished “us”
and “them”; the religious fault-lines often coincided with ethnic and linguistic ones.
Growing up in that milieu it would be possible to become convinced that religion is a
cultural aspect of ethnic and national identity and should be dealt with as such.
Stalin’s writings are curiously devoid of specifically religious discussion. Although
he wrote about ethnicity and nationality, religion as a category of its own never became
a subject of a major published work.57 However, it would be wrong to assume that he
was totally ignorant of the subject matter. On the contrary, by the time Stalin had begun
writing on Marxism and related subjects, he was already somewhat of an expert on
religion, having completed several years at the Tiflis Seminary.
In considering Stalin’s time at the seminary in relation to his later career, and in
light of Stalin’s “reconciliation” with Orthodoxy in 1943, we are forced to reevaluate
Trotsky’s description of him as a “gray blur”. Was the concordat a kind of “return” to his
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earlier beliefs? Did the Supreme Leader want to re-introduce an updated version of
Russian imperial theocracy that the Bolsheviks had supplanted?
We need to pay closer attention to the two questions that interest us the most
here: was Stalin as ideologically unprepared as Trotsky believed him to be, and had he,
in light of this unpreparedness, simply decided to backtrack to the ideological
foundations of old Russia, reviving the imperial church and re-inventing himself as a
new kind of tsar? Moshe Lewin takes the “backtrack” position. He has claimed that late
Stalinism dispensed with the trappings of Marxism-Leninism altogether and returned to
the basic political ideas of the late tzarism.58 I acknowledge that this view is supported
by at least some circumstantial evidence, in particular Stalin’s general support for
Russian language, culture, and nationalism. It might seem like the secularism
associated with revolutionary Marxism was being stripped away and something
reactionary being put in its place. I argue, however, that this line of interpretation is
ultimately unconvincing. There is no evidence that Stalin ever abandoned Marxism
because of his newly discovered interest in traditional Russian religion and culture. On
the contrary, his political views developed towards Marxism under the influence of
studies in Orthodox Christianity and Russian history while he was still a very young
man.
What was Stalin’s education at the seminary like? What might he have learned
there, not just about religion but about ideology more generally? It is interesting to note
that Trotsky, who looked down on Stalin as an ideologue, studied mathematics (like
Stalin, he did not graduate). As a result, we might assume that he received little to no
classroom exposure to the study of ideology more commonly taught in the social
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sciences and humanities. Stalin’s later pretensions were based entirely on self-study
and his later contact with European revolutionaries.
Stalin’s biographers largely ignore his years at the seminary. They are helped by
Stalin’s own relative silence on the topic. It seems that the general assumption is that
Stalin’s pious mother more or less forced him to study to become a priest and that he
did not learn much there. Some sources insist that Stalin quit because he could not pay
the fees. The dictator himself later claimed that he left to study Marxism. The kind of
formative education Stalin received at the seminary is often brushed aside by his
biographers who are eager to discuss only his Marxist period, which commenced
around the time he decided to leave the seminary. However, the Tiflis Seminary was a
remarkable institution. It was the main seat of ecclesiastical learning in Georgia, one of
the most ancient Christian states. By the time Stalin enrolled there, it was more or less
completely Russified. The only subjects relating to Georgia were the language classes
and ancient Georgian church singing.
By looking at the seminary records of the future dictator, it is possible to get a
great deal of insight into his early intellectual development.59 The records are very
copious, including not only transcripts, but also grades for individual assignments,
troublemaking and mischief reports, and lists of borrowed library books, etc. It is, of
course, far from straightforward to interpret those records. There could have been
issues of absenteeism, patronage, grade inflation, severity of individual instructors, and
others, which are somewhat intangible. Nevertheless, those documents can help us to
gain insight into the formative years in Stalin’s life.

59

Stalin Personal Fund Archive #558, РГАСПИ. Ф. 558. Оп. 4: Biographical Documents.
http://sovdoc.rusarchives.ru/sections/personality//cards/4455

66

The vanished alien world of the old clerical Russian seminary run by celibate
ascetics may seem strange and alien to some observers. However, the Tiflis Seminary
did not train “catechumens,” i.e., the recent converts to the faith and children. It was an
academic institution dedicated to the training of future leaders of the church. The degree
that Stalin was studying for is probably most similar to the MDiv (Master of Divinity)
degree in the USA today, except that it was a Bachelor’s degree. Like the MDiv, it
consisted of liturgical training and also included a broad range of secular humanistic
subjects.
The Tiflis Seminary offered coursework in Biblical Studies (the Old and the New
Testament); in the Greek, Russian, and Georgian languages; in liturgical singing in the
Byzantine tradition, including Greek and Old Church Slavonic, as well as Georgian
national styles; in history, mainly European, with a heavy focus on the history of the
Russian state; in mathematics and logic; and in a surprisingly broad selection of “liberal
studies,” ranging from the philosophy of Kant to a seminar on “the best seasons of the
human life.” Young Stalin’s records show a predilection for some of those topics and a
distaste for others, and his grades fluctuate depending on the given assignment.
Extra-curricular interests also seemed to affect Stalin’s academic performance, his
grades fluctuating towards the end of his period at the seminary.60 At some point he
might have ranked as high as fifth in the class of twenty-nine, but in his last year he was
twentieth out of twenty-three.
It is a well-known fact that Stalin had a beautiful voice. He learned professional
singing at the seminary and sang willingly, even as he got older, often together with his
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political associates. He had the best grades in Russian and Georgian liturgical singing
(an area with a lot of credit hours and specializations), and he sang church music in his
spare time. That was clearly an area in which young Stalin performed very well.
Perhaps, given a different set of circumstances, he could have ended up with a career
as a church singer (“pevchii”), or a conductor of the Byzantine-style church choir
(“regent”).
Another area in which the future dictator performed well was literature,
particularly secular literature that was taught sparingly at the seminary. It is clear that
Stalin loved 19th century classics such as the poems of Pushkin and the fables of
Krylov. He was much less interested in Biblical literatures and his grades on various
Biblical topics were poor. Such literary interests also make sense in the light of what we
know about the older Stalin. In his memoir Conversations with Stalin, the Yugoslav
ambassador Djilas mentions that the Russian dictator was interested in classic Russian
literature and eager to talk about Dostoevsky, Pushkin, or Gorky.61
Djilas also mentioned that Stalin had a special interest in history, particularly
military history, perhaps unsurprising for a dedicated Marxist. The history curriculum at
the Tiflis Seminary consisted mostly of courses on Russian history. Stalin was clearly
interested in later stages of Russian history; his grades on topics relating to the ancient
princes of Kievan Rus and the pre-imperial Muscovy were not great, but we can see a
spark of interest when Stalin gets a better grade for the study of the “foreign policy of
Ivan IV,” later one of the dictator’s favorite tsars. Overall, the general impression given
by Stalin’s academic records is that he was well prepared for a career in public life or
politics even though he did not graduate. He likely became more confident speaking
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and writing Russian during the years at seminary, and he became acquainted with a
variety of academic subjects. As the preceding analysis has demonstrated, Stalin was
more able than is commonly assumed to deal with the issues of the religious reforms in
the USSR of the 1940s. He did not have to catch up with the subject matter because he
already knew it better than many of his subordinates.
Joseph Stalin saw himself as being engaged in the global revolutionary project
that was shaping the society of the future, industrializing the planet, and anticipating the
arrival of the communist utopia. But he himself was shaped by the world of the
seminary, which taught him several lessons that affected his worldview for the rest of his
life. He was fond of reminiscing about it in private, although he never emphasized it in
public. The Tiflis seminary was characterized by a semi-colonial way of life that was
imposed on Georgia by Moscow. Russian was the only language used for record
keeping in the seminary and it was also the language of instruction. Georgian was only
studied for historical and liturgical reasons. This semi-colonial ideology was readily
absorbed by Stalin, who saw Russia as a more European and modern society that had
a right to impose its language and culture on its colonies. There is no reason to think
that Stalin was ever a Georgian nationalist. Russian colonial cosmopolitanism was an
ideology he probably absorbed at the seminary and he remained loyal to it for the rest of
his life. He also understood at an early age how cosmopolitanism interacted with local
identities in the sphere of religion: although religion was always a part of national
identity, it did not limit itself to the sphere of the local but aspired to the global mission.
For Stalin, and other seminarian revolutionaries mentioned by Kotkin, the most
important lesson learned at the Tiflis Seminary was that everything in the world is based
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on ideology and the true ideology is systematic and has absolute authority. Stalin also
learned not only Christian theology and liturgy, but the philosophy of German idealism
and the dialogues of Plato (in original Greek, it seems). His education at the Seminary
likely offered a preparation for his later readings of Marxist works, and his embrace of
dialectical materialism.
Stalin’s love of great Russian autocrats and absolutist rulers of the past was also
something he might have picked up at the Seminary, or later given his lifelong passion
for continuous learning. The Seminary introduced him to Peter the Great and Ivan the
Terrible. His library record shows that he borrowed books on ancient Roman
emperors.62 Although Stalin never attempted to found a dynasty, he did develop an
affection for one-person strongman rule. It is also not incidental that Peter the Great and
Ivan the Terrible were the most important reformers of religion in Russian history: the
former had restricted it to increase his monarchical power and modernize the country,
and the latter had used it to expand his state by expanding his empire and introducing
the Orthodox Church in non-Christian areas.
Marxism, as we saw earlier, developed in opposition to idealist thought systems
in general and to Christianity in particular. The influence of Marxism was decisive, of
course, and probably contributed to Stalin’s withdrawal from the Seminary. The historic
record on why he had to leave before graduating is inconclusive, however. We do not
know why he left and what was the decisive factor: his health, parental pressure,
change of interests, money concerns, etc. All of those were mentioned in one context or
the other. The decisive influence of Marxism on young Stalin and Stalin’s terror against
the clergy during the 1930s make it very unlikely that the dictator was interested in his
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religious reforms just for the sake of the well-being of the ROC. On the contrary, he
pursued an agenda of his own. The destruction of the Catholics in Ukraine could have
been just the first episode in the global ideological battle for which he was willing to
enlist the help of religious organizations that were now totally under his control.
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Conclusion: Late Stalinism and World Religions

Joseph Stalin’s religious reform of 1943 can give the deceiving appearance of an
“archaizing” revolution, i.e., the return to the pre-revolutionary status quo. Such a theory
of revolution implies that Stalin, an aging, ex-seminarian Soviet dictator, was tired of
Marxism and the Bolshevik experimentation, and attempted to resurrect the old tsarist
order, reinstate the old state religion, reimpose Russian nationalism, reintroduce old
cultural and social mores, and maybe even create a new ruling class out of the Soviet
Communist party.63 Under this theory, the USSR was to remain Marxist-Leninist in name
only, but in content was to revert to the old tsarist Russian political system.
Yet there are no grounds for this interpretation. Stalin did not alter the official
state ideology in any drastic way. Regardless of its new role in the USSR, the church
still had to exist in a society where the official ideology was Marxism-Leninism. Various
restrictions on church activities remained in force. Although the activities of the League
of the Militant Godless were curtailed, Marxist propaganda persisted in other forms.
Stalin did not convert to Russian Orthodox Christianity in his old age, just as he did not
become a Muslim or a Buddhist. He used the same institutional and ideological
framework in his reform of all three world religions.
The late Stalinist USSR was not an “archaizing” state that reverted to the old
ideological and political ideas under the guise of Marxism-Leninism. On the contrary, it
was an active Bolshevik revolutionary state that presented its own administrative
structures in the guise of religious organizations. In that sense, the Soviet
understanding of religion was not so different from the Soviet understanding of
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nationality. Both were rooted in classical Marxism - what truly mattered to the leaders
were property relations within the state and its economic structure. Culture, ethnicity,
and religion were remnants of the old society and were bound to disappear entirely as
the cosmopolitan Communist utopia drew closer.
In 1950 Stalin published one of his most important books, Marxism and
Linguistics. In that book, he argued that language was not part of the Marxist
“superstructure” but was a part of the material “base.” What he meant was that there
was no such thing as “class language.” The boundaries of language transcended class,
and language itself was in some sense a material phenomenon. Why was he
preoccupied with philosophy of language in his old age? While the discussion is
undoubtedly very abstract, it can be read as Stalin’s apologia for playing with such
ostensibly “reactionary” things like religion or nationalism. The USSR was meant to be a
new kind of state where the old capitalist property relationships were replaced by new
socialist property relationships. Insofar as the older patterns of property ownership were
destroyed, the organizations that were based on the older patterns simply disappeared
without a trace. Whatever remained - rituals, languages, old books of theology, etc. were now simply a relic of a fundamentally “classless” language in a socialist society,
not unlike the ancient objects in museums that had long lost their original functions. The
old enemy had disappeared forever, unless it was to be re-imported again from the
capitalist world, should Stalin’s ongoing project of world revolution be threatened by a
foreign capitalist conspiracy.
The way the reform of 1943 was implemented, and particularly its focus on the
destruction of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the western provinces, point to the
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geopolitical role of Stalin’s approach to world religions. “We need something like a new
Vatican,” Stalin confessed to Karpov.64 Like a master chess player, Stalin looked over
the entirety of Eurasia, carefully placing his pieces in all the strategic positions. In the
West, the Catholics were pushed back and lost their property and influence to Stalin’s
Orthodoxy. The Japanese invasion had not taken place but, in 1943, the first Buddhist
temple, the Ivolga Datsan, was founded in Buryatia, in Eastern Asia, where only a few
decades earlier multiple temples had dotted the landscape. Did it have a planned role in
the event of a new war and chaos in Asia? The geographical location points to
Mongolia, China, and Japan in the east, and Tibet and India in the south. The same
year, in 1943, the Central Asian Muftiate was created, centered in Tashkent. 65 It unified
the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan under one administrative umbrella. Was it
meant to be a political weapon for the expansion further south?
We might never know what Stalin really thought on the subject of this religious
reform and its connection to international politics. It is not even clear that the reform of
Soviet world religions was completed as intended. However, Stalin was preoccupied
with the question of territorial and ideological security during his entire political career.
Ideological security does have a territorial aspect when it boils down to local identities.
Seen in this way, Stalin’s religious reform can be interpreted as a bulwark against
foreign influence, a platform for revolutionary expansion, and, fundamentally, as a state
security measure.
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